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1 Introduction
Cardiovascular disease and cancers cause almost two-thirds of the overall burden of disease
in developed countries. A large number of these chronic diseases are due to lifestyle-related
risk factors, most of which are preventable. In particular, poor dietary habits contribute
to these diseases through excessive intakes of salt, carbohydrates, and fats and insufficient
intakes of fruits and vegetables. According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
combined with actions reducing physical inactivity and tobacco use, preventing diet-related
risk factors could lead to an increase in the average life expectancy by three to five years
in high-income countries (WHO, 2009).
To address these public health issues, governments and public health agencies have
been implementing policies intended to promote preventive behaviors thanks to information
campaigns and food product labeling. Reviews of these policies show that they have some
positive impacts that, however, remain small, at least in the medium term (Brambila-
Macias et al., 2011). In addition, these policies are suspected to increase health inequalities,
with less-educated individuals responding less to information policy (Etile´, 2013).
Given the modest impacts of information-based policies, public health agencies are
now considering other policies to modify the market environment to facilitate healthier
food choices, even by non-health-sensitive consumers. A broad range of instruments have
been considered, from price policies to nutrition-related standards (Brambila-Macias et al.,
2011). In this context, public health agencies and policy makers urge the food industry to
favor a better food environment through changes in the quality and variety of foods and
through changes in advertising and marketing (WHO, 2012a).
In the design of policies, it is important to anticipate how food firms will react to nutri-
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tional policies because, depending on the design of the policy, firms may amplify or weaken
its impacts. A few recent works have begun to consider the strategic price reactions of food
firms in response to health and nutrition policies (Bonnet and Re´quillart, 2013; Allais et al.,
2015; Dubois et al., 2016). Firms can also affect the health outcomes of food consumption
through their decisions regarding the quality and variety of foods. In general, the response
of firms is based on market segmentation and product differentiation. Nutrition and health
claims (such as ‘rich in fibers’, ‘light in sugar’, ‘enriched in vitamins’, etc.) play this role
by targeting health-sensitive consumers who have higher willingness to pay for additional
health functions in foods. Market shares for those products, however, remain relatively
small, at approximately 20%. Regarding the remaining part of the market, the nutritional
quality of food is more contrasted (Re´quillart and Soler, 2014). For this reason, public
health agencies urge the food industry to commit, in individual or collective agreements,
to reduce the level of ‘bad’ nutrients in food products. Empirical studies have shown
some moves, sometimes quite significant, by some brands or for some nutrients (Webster
et al., 2011; Rahkovsky et al., 2012). On the whole, however, the economic and public
health literatures tend to consider firms to have weak incentives to enter into a product
reformulation strategy intended to improve the nutritional quality of products.
Several explanations have been proposed. A first impediment relies on the cost issue.
Indeed, reformulation is likely to affect production costs. For example, changes in ingre-
dients might affect variable costs, and the development of new recipes might require R&D
expenditures (Traill et al., 2012). A second reason is based on asymmetry of information
between producers and consumers. Smith (2004) suggested that consumers do not really
know a product’s quality, even when nutrient fact panels are available on food packages, as
3
these panels are difficult to understand. This asymmetric information problem results in
a ‘lemons-style’ breakdown in the market for processed foods, leading to the ‘McDonald’s
equilibrium’ in which low quality covers the entire market. A third reason is related to
the ‘addiction assumption’. If the consumption of added sugars or fat leads to addictive
behaviors, then firms have strong incentives to continue to market foods high in sugar or
fat content (Smith and Tasnadi, 2007). This assumption is plausible but remains contro-
versial, even among neurophysiologists and nutritionists. A fourth explanation relies on
consumers’ expectations. Indeed, many studies show that, despite the fact that moderate
changes in salt or fat content are not always perceived by consumers, once they know, many
consumers reject the reformulated product because they believe that ‘healthier’ means ‘less
tasty’ (Raghunathan and Naylor, 2006).
An example of strategic change in the quality of products is found in Moorman et al.
(2012). These authors investigated how firms responded to standardized nutrition labels
on food products required by the US Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). They
found that the NLEA had a negative effect on the nutritional quality of labelled brands
relative to control brands not required to have a nutrition label. The rationale behind
this result is found in the correlation between taste and nutrition attributes and consumer
arbitrage between taste and nutrition. If consumers believe that nutrition is negatively
correlated with taste and the taste characteristic is more important than the nutrition
characteristic in consumers’ choices, then the strategic response of firms to the NLEA is to
decrease nutritional quality to avoid discouraging consumption. This response is reinforced
by the fact that price is also a key variable for consumers, and more nutritious products
are likely to be more costly.
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To force food quality improvements, policy makers may use various instruments. A first
policy relies on the implementation of minimum quality standards (MQS). The theoretical
literature on MQS provides mixed insights. In a simple setting, in which differentiation be-
tween products relies on a single characteristic, quality standards seem to be quite efficient
(Ronnen, 1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995). For example, the ban upon trans-fatty
acid (TFA) in New York state and in Denmark, where a mandatory maximum content of
TFA was implemented in 2004, seem to have had positive impacts (Unnevehr and Jag-
manaite, 2008). In a more complex setting, however, in which products are differentiated
along multiple characteristics, setting MQS might be counterproductive, even if the market
underprovides quality (Deltas et al., 2013). Other tools such as food taxes can be designed
to influence the quality chosen by firms. For instance, the regulator might define a quality
threshold. Products that have a quality higher than the threshold are not taxed, whereas
products that have a quality lower than the threshold are taxed. Such a policy seems to
be efficient, provided that the quality threshold is not too stringent, as a firm prefers to
reformulate its product to avoid the tax, leading to positive results for health and welfare
(Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al., 2012).
The goal of this paper is to better understand firms’ strategic reactions to nutritional
policies targeting food quality improvements and to derive a set of optimal policies. We
propose a model of product differentiation, taking into account both the taste and health
characteristics of products, and use it to assess the health and welfare impacts of taxation
and MQS-based policies. An important challenge comes from the need to integrate these
two characteristics, both of which affect consumers’ utility. Addressing two dimensions
in product differentiation models is difficult. In particular, in a duopoly setting in which
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firms first choose the characteristics of products and then compete in prices, it remains
very difficult to determine the optimal choice of characteristics by firms in a general set-
ting. To resolve this difficulty, researchers generally impose some restrictions on the choice
of characteristics and/or on the heterogeneity of consumers. Thus, to analyze nutritional
policies, Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012) designed a duopoly model in which products are
differentiated according to two characteristics. They studied the impact of the entry of a
firm on this market and assumed that the incumbent firm cannot change the characteris-
tics of its product, thus restricting the complexity of the problem. In addition, they also
placed some restrictions on the heterogeneity of consumers. Deltas et al. (2013) explored
a duopoly operating in a market with consumers who care about both an environmental
attribute and another brand-specific attribute. They developed a two-dimensional differen-
tiation model and assumed that firms cannot choose the brand-specific attribute. They also
restricted the heterogeneity of consumers, assuming that consumers all value identically
the environmental attribute.
In the model of product differentiation we develop, we consider two mono-product firms
competing on price and product characteristics. The products are differentiated along a
one-dimensional product characteristic axis (e.g., more or less salty), but the position of a
product on this axis may affect consumers’ utility in two ways: through its health impact
(the lower the content in salt, the greater the health benefits), on the one hand, and its
taste (due to the content in salt), on the other hand. Thus, we take into account the
linkages between the nutritional quality of food products and their taste characteristics.
This complex relationship between the taste and health characteristics of a product is a
key point in the analysis of firms’ strategy.
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Using this framework, we compare the impact of three policies - imposing an MQS;
setting an excise tax based on the nutrient content of the two products; and setting an
excise tax based on the nutrient content of the ‘bad’ product - on consumer demand, prices,
product characteristics, a health indicator, and welfare.
We show that firms respond differently to the three instruments, leading to different
impacts on market and public health outcomes. Among the three policies we analyze, we
find that only the MQS policy and the linear excise tax on the low-quality product are
effective in a general sense. The choice, however, between the two depends on the priorities
of the regulator and on the consumers resistance to move away from their initial taste
preferences. Finally, we show that policies intended to change the food market environment
allow for greater health benefits and welfare than policies based solely on information
campaigns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 the bench-
mark equilibrium and Section 4 the choice of qualities by social planner. Section 5 contains
the analysis of firms’ strategic reactions to different policy interventions. In Section 6, we
determine and compare the optimal policies chosen by social planners. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 An illustrative example
Let us first consider an illustrative example to make explicit the precise questions we wish
to address and to justify the main assumptions of the model. This example concerns public
health issues related to salt intake. Elevated dietary salt intake is an established risk factor
for high blood pressure and cardiovascular events (He et al., 2013; Hendriksen et al., 2014).
Consequently, the WHO has recognized excess dietary salt intake as a global problem and
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set a worldwide target of less than 5 g salt per day per person (WHO, 2012b).
To reach this goal, governments are implementing salt-reduction strategies in many
countries through information campaigns and interventions designed to improve the nutri-
tional quality of foods. As shown by a recent study in the U.K., these actions may have
some positive impacts (Shankar et al., 2013).
On the supply side, significant efforts intended to reduce the salt content of food are
underway (Dotsch-Klerk et al., 2015). A remarkable case is the U.K., which has been
developing a strategy to progressively reduce population salt intake (He et al., 2013).
Thus, in 2005, the UK Food Standards Agency established target levels of salt for each food
category. The changes in food quality implemented by food firms contributed to a reduction
in the average salt intake at the consumer level (Griffith et al., 2014). This reduction,
however, has been smaller than expected, and the average consumer’s salt intake remains
above the daily target (Shankar et al., 2013; Webster et al., 2010). Overall, these actions
have encouraged sodium reductions in existing food products, but consumer acceptance,
cost and complications arising from the use of sodium alternatives remain limitations to
food reformulation (Kloss et al., 2015).
Regarding consumers, high salt content generally makes food more palatable. The
reduction of salt in foods may then significantly alter the taste of the product and be
perceived negatively by consumers. As shown by Bobowski et al. (2015), some subjects
with low hedonic sensitivity may respond favorably to salt-reduction strategies and would
likely have no difficulty in adjusting to the taste of reduced-salt foods. However, subjects
with high hedonic sensitivity disliked reduced-salt foods and would likely have difficulty
in adjusting to the taste of reduced-salt foods. In addition, most consumers are not really
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aware of the health impacts of high salt intakes. Empirical studies in sensory sciences
clearly show that consumers differ not only in salt liking but also in their awareness of the
health impacts of salt intake and their motivation to decrease salt intake. For instance,
Kenten et al. (2013) conducted a study in the U.K. to analyze consumers perceptions
of salt in foods. They showed that most participants were unaware of the advised salt
guidelines, unclear about how much they consume, and unsure about the precise connection
between high salt intake and negative health impacts. Newson et al. (2013) conducted an
international study that shows that one-third of consumers were not interested in salt
reduction and that the majority were unaware of health recommendations. Grimes et al.
(2009) conducted a survey in Australia that shows that 73% of consumers were unaware of
the maximum daily guideline for salt. Just under half of the participants were concerned
about the amount of salt in their diet and believed their health would improve if they
lowered their salt intake.
On the supply side, voluntary commitments by firms to improve the nutritional quality
of foods remain modest. Firms reluctance to decrease the salt content in foods echoes
consumers resistance. Preferences for salty taste and misperceptions of the health impact
of salt intake may limit consumers willingness to reduce consumption of salt, leading to
commercial risks for producers that commit to decrease salt content in foods. Moreover,
technological solutions that can be used to compensate for taste modification are imperfect,
leading many consumers to appreciate the product less and even, for some of them, to
reject it (He and MacGregor, 2009). Finally, removing salt in foods may induce additional
production costs: to decrease the salt content in ham without worsening its quality in
other respects, firms will need additional processes, and this will make production more
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costly. Moreover, for example, a piece of ham with less salt contains less water, leading
to a decrease in the product weight, resulting in an increase in per unit cost (He and
MacGregor, 2009).
Confronted with the limitations of information campaigns targeting consumers and the
modest impact of voluntary commitments by firms, the WHO and some governments are
considering more coercive interventions based on quality regulation and fiscal policies. For
instance, Portugal and Hungary have implemented taxes on foods with high salt content.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine the potential effects of these interventions.
2.2 Main assumptions
We develop a duopoly model of product differentiation. There are two firms i and j
producing a product with characteristics xi and xj respectively. The characteristic is the
product’s content of some nutrient (e.g., salt content). Each firm chooses the content of
its product on a [0,1] interval. This characteristic has two effects on the product.
First, it affects the taste of the product. From a consumer perspective, this is a hori-
zontally differentiated characteristic, as some consumers might have different preferences
for the taste of the product. We model this as in the standard Hotelling model, and a con-
sumer faces a transportation cost that is a function of the distance between her location
(denoted x) and the location of the chosen product. We assume a uniform distribution of
x over [0,1]; when x approaches 1, this means that this consumer prefers a high content of
the nutrient.
Second, the characteristic xi also determines the healthiness of the good. We assume
that, as in the salt example, we are in a situation in which consumers have to reduce their
intake of the considered nutrient, and we focus on a product category in which policies
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are designed to make the products healthier. As the xi characteristic of product i is its
nutrient content, the lower xi is the better the product is from a health perspective.
From the consumer perspective, this health attribute is modeled as a vertically differ-
entiated characteristic. However, in contrast to the taste attribute, the health impact of
the product is not perfectly known by consumers. We instead assume that, as suggested
in empirical studies presented above, consumers differ in their awareness of, that is in their
beliefs concerning, the health impacts of nutrient intakes. We denote λ as the awareness of
a consumer and assume that it is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. A ‘λ = 1’ consumer per-
fectly estimates the health impact of the nutrient intake. A ‘λ < 1’ consumer imperfectly
estimates the probability of health damages and underestimates this health impact. A
‘λ = 0’ consumer does not perceive any risk induced by the consumption of the considered
nutrient.
Note that xi and thus (1 − xi) are perfectly known by the consumers. In the case of
taste, consumers correctly evaluate the impact on their utility of consuming a product of
characteristic xi. Conversely, the impact on health, that is λ(1− xi), is not well estimated
by most consumers because it cannot be simply inferred from the location on the horizontal
axis. The consequence is that consumers perception of the health impacts of salt intake
may be imprecise and even biased. In fact, most of them underestimate these health
consequences.
In sum, from the firm perspective, this model is a one-dimensional model of product
differentiation. From the consumer perspective, however, it is a two-dimensional model
because, for a given characteristic, a consumer infers two characteristics that have an effect
on her utility. A consumer is thus represented by her characteristics (x, λ). We denote
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Uc(x, λ) as the utility that consumer (x, λ) obtains when she buys one unit of product c,
c ∈ {i, j}, and write:
Uc(x, λ) = v − t(xc − x)2 + λ(1− xc)− pc, (1)
with t being the per unit transportation cost. Then, t(xc − x)2 is the transportation cost
as in the Hotelling model. It represents the disutility of not consuming the ideal food that
consumer x has to suffer if she buys a product of characteristic xc. The term λ(1 − xc)
is the health component of the utility, where λ is the consumer’s awareness of health, and
1− xc represents the healthfulness of product c. The closer the food is to 1, the lower the
health-related utility a consumer obtains. This part of the model is similar to a Mussa-
Rosen model with (1−xc) being the quality of product c. pc is the price charged by firm c.
Finally, v is the intrinsic utility that consumers obtain from buying this food. As the two
products differ only in their content of the specific ingredient, v is the same for the two
products. We assume that v is large enough that the market is covered. In the following,
we denote by Ui and Uj the utility a consumer receives when buying one unit of a product
from firm i and j, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that xj > xi. Firm i
produces the ‘healthy’ product, and firm j produces the ‘unhealthy’ product. We will also
refer to these products as high-quality and low-quality products, respectively.
By equating Ui and Uj , we obtain the indifference line along which the consumers are
indifferent between consuming product i and consuming product j. It is given by
λ = 2tx− t(xj + xi)− pj − pi
xj − xi . (2)
Note that the slope of the indifference line is 2t. If t ≥ 1/2, then the slope of the
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indifference line is greater than (or equal to) 1, which means that taste weights more than
the consumers’ perception of health impacts. If t < 1/2, the opposite holds. As discussed
above, consumers place a higher weight on taste than health in their food choices. As a
consequence, in the following, we concentrate on the case in which t > 1/2, as taste plays
an important role in consumers’ choice. Consumers located to the left of the indifference
line buy from firm i, and consumers located to the right of this line buy from firm j. It is
easy to deduce the demand Di and Dj faced by firms i and j, respectively. When consumer
(0,0) buys product i and consumer (1,1) buys product j, we have
Di =
1
2t
[t(xi + xj) +
pj − pi
xj − xi +
1
2
], (3)
Dj = 1−Di = 1
2t
[
4t− 1
2
− t(xi + xj)− pj − pi
xj − xi ]. (4)
We also define the demand functions when consumer (0,0) buys product j or when
consumer (1,1) buys product i, as they are useful for fully characterizing the equilibrium
(see the Appendix).1
From the supply side, modifying the nutrient content of food is costly. Following
Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012), we assume that the marginal cost of production is a
quadratic function of the product’s healthfulness, that is, 1 − xc for a firm producing
a product of characteristic xc.
2 We write
c(xc) =
(1− xc)2
2
. (5)
1Technically, with t < 1/2, it is more convenient to define the demand depending on the value of λ when
x = 0 or x = 1. Consumers located under the indifference curve consume product j, and consumers located
above the indifference curve consume product i. As before, we also obtain three cases for demand.
2With a linear form, in the standard case in which consumer (0,0) chooses product i and consumer (1,1)
chooses product j, we do not obtain equilibrium in which xi and xj are interior solutions on [0,1].
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The profit functions of a firm is written as follows:
Πc = [pc − (1− xc)
2
2
]Dc, c = (i, j), (6)
which is the product of the per unit mark-up and the quantity demanded.
2.3 Health index and welfare
The goal of the paper is to analyze how policies affect the equilibrium prices, the charac-
teristics of the products, and their impact on health and welfare. We now define the health
index and welfare.
As explained above, xc is the content of a product c with respect to a nutrient that
adversely affects health. The lower xc is, the better it is from a health perspective. Then,
(1−xi) and (1−xj) are indicators of the healthfulness of products i and j, respectively. As
each consumer consumes one unit of either of the two products, the health status of each
individual is directly related to the quality (nutrient content) of the chosen product. In
epidemiological models, the impact on health of a change in the consumption of a nutrient
is evaluated via a relative risk index (RR). This index links a change in the consumption
of the nutrient by a consumer to a change in the probability of contracting a disease. To
integrate this issue into our analysis, we define the health index of a consumer consuming
a product located in xc by hc = (1−xc). By doing so, we consider the simple case in which
the RR does not vary with the initial intake.3
As we consider public health issues, we define the aggregate index over the market.
From a public health perspective, the overall population’s health depends on the nutritional
3A more general case would be to assume that the impact of a given change in consumption does depend
on the initial level of consumption. In our case of an ‘unhealthy’ nutrient, this would mean that a given
decrease in the consumption of the nutrient has a greater impact for a consumer who already has a high level
of consumption (that is, who consumes product j) than for a consumer who has a low level of consumption
(that is, who consumes product i).
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quality of the marketed products and the market shares of the different products. Then,
we consider the following public health index hij :
hij = (1− xi)Di + (1− xj)Dj . (7)
The definition of welfare also needs some discussion. Social welfare is the sum of
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax revenues if there are any tax revenues. The
issue is related to how the social planner evaluates the health impact of consumption.
As explained above, we assume that consumers differently estimate the health impacts of
nutrient intakes. The parameter λ is consumer awareness regarding health. A consumer
with a low value of λ underestimates the health impact of consumption, whereas a consumer
with a high value of λ almost exactly estimates the health impact. This assumption is
similar to the distinction proposed by Salanie and Treich (2009) regarding citizens beliefs
concerning water supply contamination. If these beliefs are biased (compared to the real
risk perfectly known by the social planner), then it is possible to consider two types of
social planners.
A first case corresponds to a populist social planner who evaluates the consumer surplus
on the basis of the utility function of consumers (we denote the associated level of social
welfare SW1). Such a social planner maximizes social welfare based on citizens beliefs
regarding the health impact of food intake. He assumes that the health damages supported
by λ < 1 consumers are the result of their own perception, and thus evaluates the consumer
surplus as consumers do.4 A second case corresponds to a paternalistic social planner who
4As pointed out by a referee, using such a utility function might be motivated by a political economy
argument. A government, who has an interest in being reelected, has some incentives to ‘please’ consumers
(the voters). As consumers evaluate the policies based on their own utility function, the government uses
the same utility function in his welfare maximizing analysis.
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fully integrates the health impact of consumption (Cremer et al., 2012).5 In this case,
the social planner is paternalist and maximizes social welfare based on his own beliefs
λ = 1. To some extent, he acts in the place of consumers by taking into account their
health damages. The consumer surplus is then evaluated by the social planner on the basis
of a modified utility function.6 From the social planner’s perspective, a consumer who
consumes product i receives the following utility:
U ′i = v − t(xi − x)2 + (1− xi)− pi. (8)
The utility now includes the ‘true’ impact of consumption on health (we denote the
associated social welfare SW2).
3 Benchmark Equilibrium
To analyze competition between the two firms, we assume that they play a two-stage
game. In the first stage, firm i and firm j simultaneously choose the characteristic of
their products (xi, xj). After they and consumers observe their choices, they compete a`
la Bertrand and simultaneously choose prices (pi, pj). Consumers then make their choice
and profits are realized. The design of the game is standard and reflects the idea that the
choice of the characteristic of a product is a long-term decision whereas the choice of a
price is a short-term decision.
5This objective function could be that chosen by the ministry of health, whereas the government as the
whole would maximize the standard welfare as the populist social planner does. The ministry of health
places significant weight on health, whereas the government as a whole adopts a more balanced view. For
instance, as we will see below, the policy chosen by the populist social planner has less negative impacts on
firms’ profits than the policy chosen by the paternalist social planner. Finally, note that a more extreme
view of the behavior of the ministry of health is to consider that he is maximizing the health index only.
The implication of such a behavior is briefly discussed in the ‘optimal policy’ section.
6Note that we assume that all consumers under-estimate the health impact, as stated in many surveys
(Newson et al., 2013).
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To solve the two-stage game, we determine the perfect equilibrium by backward induc-
tion. We determine first the Nash price equilibrium in the sub-game given the character-
istics xi and xj . Then, we determine the optimal characteristics of product, denoted x
B
i
and xBj .
At the second stage, assuming that consumer (0,0) buys product i and consumer (1,1)
buys product j, prices are given by
p∗i (xi, xj) =
1
6
[2(1− xi)2 + (1− xj)2 + (xj − xi)(1 + 2t(2 + xi + xj))], (9)
p∗j (xi, xj) =
1
6
[(1− xi)2 + 2(1− xj)2 + (xi − xj)(1 + 2t(−4 + xi + xj))]. (10)
From (9) and (10), we deduce the profits of firm i and j, pii(p
∗
i (xi, xj), p
∗
j (xi, xj)) and
pij(p
∗
i (xi, xj), p
∗
j (xi, xj)), which are maximized wrt xi and xj , respectively. The equilibrium
locations in the first-stage game are given by
xBi =
1− t
2(1 + 2t)
, (11)
xBj =
1 + 5t
2(1 + 2t)
. (12)
Note that (11) and (12) impose t < 1. In the Appendix, we provide detailed computa-
tions that show that the existence and the unicity of equilibrium depend on t.
When t is small (t < t¯ ' 0.589), that is when taste plays a relatively small role compared
to health, two equilibriums may exist. One equilibrium is such that xi = 0, and the other is
such that xj = 1. In the first case, the quality of product i is maximal and few consumers
buy product i, that is, those who both like a product with a low content of the nutrient
and are aware of the health impact of consuming such a product. All other consumers buy
the low-quality product, some because they are unaware of the health impact of doing so,
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and some because they enjoy eating a product with a high content of the nutrient. In the
second equilibrium, xj is set at the maximum and few consumers buy the product. Those
consumers are unaware of the health impact of doing so and prefer a product with a high
content of the nutrient. All other consumers buy the high-quality product, some because
they are aware of the health impact of doing so, and some because they enjoy eating a
product with low content of the nutrient.
When t is higher (t > t¯ ' 0.589), we obtain a unique equilibrium in which the optimal
characteristics of products i and j are in the range of possible locations (that is, 0 ≤ xi ≤
xj ≤ 1). Given the goals of this article, this case is much more interesting, as it corresponds
to situations in which t is quite large and thus in which consumers are more reluctant to
move away from their preferred location in taste. As suggested above, this is meaningful,
as it is well known that taste plays a major role in food choices. For this reason, in the
remainder of the paper, we limit our analysis to the following case:
t¯ ' 0.589 ≤ t ≤ 1. (13)
We provide in Table 1 a full characterization of the equilibrium in function of the
parameter t. In equilibrium, firms choose characteristics that are symmetric, that is,
xBi = 1 − xBj . The profits of both firms are equal. This comes from the fact that the
absolute markups of producers i and j are equal (pBi − c(xBi ) = pBj − c(xBj ) = 3t
2
1+2t) and
demands are equal.
We now discuss the comparative statics in equilibrium. When t increases, and assuming
that the characteristics of both products are given, the demand faced by each producer
becomes less elastic. Thus, for a firm, a decrease in its own price, assuming that the price
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Expression t ↑
xBi
1−t
2(1+2t)
↓
xBj
1+5t
2(1+2t)
↑
pBi
1+10t+49t2+48t3
8(1+2t)2
↑
pBj
1−2t+25t2+48t3
8(1+2t)2
↑
DBi = D
B
j
1
2
-
piBi = pi
B
j
3t2
2(1+2t)
↑
xBj − xBi 3t1+2t ↑
hBij
1
2
-
CSB 9+8t−170t
2
48(1+2t)
nm
SW1B 9+8t−26t
2
48(1+2t)
nm
SW2B 15+32t−26t
2
48(1+2t)
nm
nm: not meaningful.
Table 1: Characterization of the benchmark
of the other firm is given, now attracts fewer consumers. Facing a less elastic demand, each
producer has an incentive to increase its price, leading to a higher price in equilibrium.7
However, each firm has also an interest in adjusting the location of its product. Thus, when
t increases, a consumer is more likely to purchase the product near her own location, rather
than the more distant product. This allows producers to soften competition by moving
away from one another, which allows for a further price increase.8 In addition, the marginal
7Technically, when qualities are given, the best reply functions (pi(pj) and pj(pi)) are upward sloping.
That is, prices are strategic complements. Moreover, in a {pi, pj} space, pj(pi) shifts upward when t
increases, while pi(pj) shifts downward, leading to an increase in prices in (second-stage) equilibrium.
8Technically, integrating the second-stage price equilibrium, the best reply functions (xi(xj) and xj(xi))
are upward sloping. That is, qualities are strategic complements. When t increases, in a {xi, xj} space,
both xj(xi) and xi(xj) shift downward. Given the respective shifts, this leads to a lower xi and a higher
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costs of producers are affected by the change in the characteristics of their products. Pro-
ducer i increases the quality of its product, generating an increase in the marginal cost
and thus in price. Producer j faces a different situation. Its marginal cost of production
decreases as a result of the decrease in the quality of its product (that is, xj increases).
The effect, however, of softened competition on price is larger than that of the marginal
cost change, and as a consequence, the price of product j increases. This also explains why
the price increase for product j is lower than that for product i. As in a standard location
model, firms’ profits increase with t. It is worth mentioning that in this model both strate-
gic variables, namely the characteristic of the product and price, are strategic complements.
When t increases, the market shares in equilibrium remain constant (Di = Dj = 1/2).
However, even if the market shares do not change, some consumers have modified their
choices. Given the qualities and prices in equilibrium, the indifference curve is written
λB(t) = λt = 2tx − t + 1/2, as we have xBi + xBj = 1 and (pBj − pBi )/(xBj − xBi ) = −1/2.
Consumer (1/2, 1/2) belongs to the indifference curve ∀t. When t increases, in equilibrium,
the indifference curve rotates counterclockwise around the point x = 1/2, λ = 1/2.9 Some
consumers with λ < 1/2 who were consuming product j (as they were located on the right
of the indifference curve) now consume product i (as they are now located on the left of
the new indifference curve). Similarly, some consumers with λ > 1/2 who were consuming
product i (as they were located on the left of the indifference curve) now consume product
xj .
9Note that, if prices and qualities were not adjusted to the change in t (that is they would still be set
at the optimum level for t rather than for t+ ∆t, with ∆t the positive change in t), we get a similar move
in the indifference curve. This is because, at the ‘unchanged’ prices and qualities, we have xBi + x
B
j = 1.
Then, from(2), the indifference curve can be written as λ = λt + 2x∆t−∆t . The point x = 1/2, λ = 1/2
still belongs to the indifference curve.
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j (as they are now located on the right of the new indifference curve). Because the rotation
is around the point x = 1/2, λ = 1/2 market shares do not change.
4 Optimal qualities for the social planner
As a reference for the analysis of the impact of policies, we now define the choice of
qualities by a social planner. The populist social planner chooses the optimal qualities and
the demand allocation that maximize social welfare, given by the following:
SW1 =
∫ x0
0
∫ 1
0
Uidλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ 1
λ(x)
Uidλdx
+
∫ 1
x1
∫ 1
0
Ujdλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ λ(x)
0
Ujdλdx
+[pi − c(xi)]x0 + x1
2
+ [pj − c(xj)](1− x0 + x1
2
).
(14)
with x0 being the location of the indifferent consumer with λ = 0 and x1 being the location
of the indifferent consumer with λ = 1. Social welfare is written as the sum of consumer
surplus and profits. The first two terms in (14) correspond to the surplus of consumers
who consume product i, the two following terms correspond to the surplus of consumers
who consume product j, and the last two terms are the profits of firm i and j, respectively.
The optimal qualities are given by
xSW1i =
−1 + 12t+ 12t2
24t(1 + 2t)
, (15)
xSW1j =
1 + 12t+ 36t2
24t(1 + 2t)
, (16)
see details in the Appendix.
It is easy to show that xBi < x
SW1
i and x
B
j > x
SW1
j . Firms have an incentive to
differentiate the products to soften price competition. For the social planner, there is no
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reason to do so, and the distortions come from transportation costs and choices of qualities.
The social planner’s choice tends to limit the wasted transportation costs and thus entail
locations corresponding to less differentiated qualities. It should be acknowledged that, in
this model in which the market is covered, a change in both prices which leave the market
shares unchanged, does not affect the social welfare.
A paternalistic social planner maximizes social welfare using a modified utility function
(Eq. 8).10 The optimal qualities are given by:
xSW2i =
1 + 12t2
24t(1 + 2t)
= xSW1i −
12t− 2
24t(1 + 2t)
, (17)
xSW2j =
−1 + 36t2
24t(1 + t)
= xSW1j −
12t+ 2
24t(1 + 2t)
. (18)
Given (13), we have xBi < x
SW2
i < x
SW1
i and x
B
j > x
SW1
j > x
SW2
j . As before, the social
planner chooses less differentiated products than firms do. Compared with the populist
social planner, the paternalistic social planner chooses higher qualities for both products.
This is intuitive because this social planner assigns greater importance than the populist
social planner to the health component in the utility function of consumers.
5 Strategic Responses to Policy Interventions
We now analyze the impact on prices, product characteristics, health, consumer surplus,
and welfare of alternative policy interventions. We analyze first the impact of an MQS
policy. The MQS requires firms operating in the market to comply with a certain quality
standard. In our context of an ‘unhealthy’ nutrient, the MQS is defined as the maximum
content of the ‘unhealthy’ nutrient content of a product. This type of policy was defined
10However, x0 and x1 are determined using the consumer utility function as consumers make their choices
using this utility function
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in the case of TFA the use of which was progressively prohibited in different countries
(Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008). That is, the maximum TFA content of food products
was progressively decreased thanks to an MQS policy. Then, we analyze the impact of
excise taxes. We design two cases. We consider first a case in which both products are
taxed as a function of their nutrient content. This type of tax was introduced in 2011 in
Denmark. The tax targeted saturated fats, and was specified in DK/kg of saturated fat in
the product (Jensen and Smed, 2013).11 The second version of the excise tax is to consider
that the tax only applies to the low-quality product. In practice, this means that some
products are taxed while others are not. We find examples of such taxes in the soft drink
market. For example, Hungary introduced a tax on soft drinks that contain more than
80g/l of added sugar (ECORYS, 2014). In practice, it means that diet products are not
taxed whereas sugary products are.
5.1 Minimum Quality Standard (MQS)
We assume that the regulator imposes a requirement that the nutrient content of the
products on the market should be lower than some threshold x¯. The MQS affects the choice
of characteristics only if x¯ < xBj . Stage 2 of the competition game is not modified, and (9)
and (10) apply because they define the price equilibrium at given product characteristics.
Stage 1 of the game is modified as the choice of firm j is constrained: we have xSj = x¯.
12
Given that firm j chooses location xSj , the optimal choice for firm i is:
xSi =
1− 4t
3(1 + 2t)
+
x¯
3
= xBi +
x¯− xBj
3
(19)
11The tax applied to a broad range of products, such as meat, dairy products, animal fats, and vegetable
oils. The tax only applied to the products that had a content level of saturated fat that was higher than
2.3%. For many markets, however (e.g., the market for oil), all products were taxed, as it was not possible
to completely remove saturated fats from those products.
12We denote with a subscript S the values of variables in equilibrium under the MQS scenario.
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When firm j faces a constraining MQS, firm i responds by lowering the nutrient content
of its product, that is, by increasing the quality of its product. We formulate in proposition
1 the main implications of the MQS policy.
Proposition 1. Under an MQS policy that restricts the choice of the characteristic of
the low-quality product, and relative to the benchmark case:
• The quality of the high-quality good increases, and the differentiation in the market
decreases;
• The price of the high-quality good decreases, whereas the price of the low-quality good
increases;
• The high-quality producer is worse off, and the low-quality producer is better off;
• The health index, the consumer surplus, and welfare increase.
Proof. See the Appendix
When the choice of quality by firm j is constrained and thus firm j increases the quality
of its product, the high-quality firm also raises the quality of its product, as qualities are
strategic complements. As shown in (19), the change in xi is smaller than that in xj ; the
differentiation between the two products decreases, leading to tougher competition. The
impact on prices depends on two opposite effects. On the one hand, the increase in quality
increases the marginal costs of production and then prices according to (9) and (10). On
the other hand, the reduced differentiation leads to more intense price competition. The
net effect of these two opposite effects is positive for firm j; that is, the price of product j
increases, whereas it is negative for firm i; that is, the price of product i decreases. Firm
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j’s price and demand increase, along with a decrease in firm i’s price and demand level. As
a consequence, firm i is worse off and firm j is better off. The health index increases due
to the improvement in the quality of both products. This effect dominates the negative
impact (on health) of the shift in demand. Thus, the indifference curve (2) shifts to the
left. As a consequence, some consumers switch from the high-quality good to the low-
quality good. We also find that consumer surplus increases, and social welfare, whether it
is defined by a populist or a paternalistic social planner, increases. In this setting in which
the market is covered, price distortions due to market power do not affect welfare directly,
as this corresponds to a transfer between consumers and producers. The distortion that
is reduced is the distortion due to the change in the characteristics of the products. The
increase in the quality of product j (that is, a lower xj) decreases the distortion on product
j, as xBj > x
SW1
j > x
SW2
j . Conversely, the increase in the quality of product i increases
the distortion on product i, as xBi < x
SW1
i . This latter negative effect is, however, lower
than the positive one due to the increase in the quality of product j.
These results are in line with those of Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander
(1995) who analyzed the impact of imposing an MQS in a duopoly framework with vertical
product differentiation and in which firms first choose the quality of their products and
then compete on price. Both papers found that the MQS acts as a commitment device for
firm j, providing this firm with a first-mover advantage. As a consequence, firm j is better
off and firm i is worse off. The papers by Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander
(1995) differ with respect to the cost of quality. In Ronnen (1991), an increase in quality
has an impact on fixed costs, whereas in Crampes and Hollander (1995), it has an impact
on variable costs, as is the case in our framework. Interestingly, in Crampes and Hollander
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(1995), the qualitative results depend on the quality adjustment of product i. When the
quality of product i increases less than that of the low-quality product, which is the case
in our model, then all qualitative results we have are similar to their results.
However, our results regarding the impact of MQS on product quality differ from those
in Deltas et al. (2013). That paper considers a duopoly operating in a market with con-
sumers who care about both an environmental attribute, which could be regarded as the
quality attribute, and another brand-specific attribute. With respect to the brand-specific
attribute, the firms are assumed to locate at the two ends of a unit interval. With respect
to the environmental attribute, consumers have the same willingness to pay for products’
greenness. In their setting, there is only consumer heterogeneity in terms of brand-specific
horizontal attributes. Additionally, the horizontal attribute and the vertical attribute are
independent. Using this framework, the authors found that firms’ environmental qualities
are strategic substitutes. Then, the implementation of an MQS leads the high-quality firm
to decrease the quality of its product, which is the opposite of our results. In our setting,
on the contrary, product qualities are strategic complements and as a result, an increase
in the standard leads to the augmentation of both products’ qualities.
5.2 Excise tax on both products
To penalize the use of the ‘unhealthy’ nutrient, the regulator imposes a tax on both prod-
ucts. To penalize the low-quality product more than the high-quality product, we consider
a linear excise tax with rate f . That is, a product of characteristic xc faces a tax f ∗ xc.
The profits of firms are given by
Πi = (pi − (1− xi)
2
2
− fxi)Di (20)
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Πj = (pj − (1− xj)
2
2
− fxj)Dj (21)
The tax acts as an increase in production costs. We formulate in proposition 2 the
main implications of the excise tax policy.
Proposition 2. Under an excise tax proportional to the nutrient content of both products,
and relative to the benchmark case:
• The content of the taxed nutrient decreases for both products by the same amount;
• The prices of both products increase;
• The profits of producers remain constant;
• The health index increases, the consumer surplus decreases, the welfare evaluated by
a populist social planner decreases, and the welfare evaluated by a paternalistic social
planner increases as long as the tax rate is not too high.
Proof. See the Appendix
To limit the impact of the tax, firms choose higher quality for their products. As a
consequence of the tax and the increased qualities, prices increase. Moreover, because the
tax is linear, the impact on the marginal cost of quality is identical for both firms (= f).
This explains why the content of the taxed nutrient decreases by the same amount for
both products. In addition, the markups remain constant, as do the market shares. The
consequence is that profits do not change. Those adjustments are a consequence of the
assumption regarding to market coverage. Thus, the cost increase, which both firms face,
can be transmitted to the consumers without losing consumers. The adjustments in price
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and qualities are such that with linear taxes, the indifference curve is not affected. Because
market shares do not change and the quality of both products increases, the health index
increases. However, consumer surplus decreases, as the tax is equivalent to a cost increase
transmitted to consumers. Social welfare, defined by a populist social planner, decreases.
On the one hand, the distortion affecting the low-quality product decreases, but on the
other hand, the distortion affecting the high-quality product increases. The overall effect on
welfare is negative. If defined by a paternalistic social planner, however, welfare increases.
Thus, the paternalistic social planner values more the health impact of consumption. The
increase in the quality of both products explains the increase in the welfare evaluated by
the paternalistic social planner.
A variant of this policy is to design a bonus malus taxation policy (maintaining the
characteristic that the tax/subsidy scheme is linear with respect to the content of the
‘unhealthy’ nutrient). That is, products that have a level of content of the ‘unhealthy’
nutrient that is lower than some threshold benefit from a subsidy. Conversely, products
that have a level of content of the ‘unhealthy’ nutrient that is larger than the threshold
are taxed. The idea is to acknowledge that the consumption of most nutrients is not ‘bad’
per se but rather that it is their excessive consumption that has negative health impacts.
Formally, rather than defining the tax by f ∗ xc for a product of characteristic xc, the
tax is defined as f ∗ (xc − x˜). This is thus a combination of the previous scheme and a
fixed subsidy to the firm. In our model, the qualities in equilibrium are not affected by
a fixed subsidy (applied to both products) or a fixed tax. Prices change by the amount
of the per unit subsidy, and hence absolute markups do not change. Other variables are
not affected. We only have a transfer between consumers and taxpayers. Thus, all of the
28
results presented in the case of a linear excise tax on the two products also apply to this
type of bonus malus policy.
5.3 Excise tax on the low-quality good
An alternative policy is to discourage the consumption of the low-quality good by imposing
a tax on this product. We maintain the same scheme as above, that is a linear excise tax,
but apply it to the low-quality product only. Thus, product j faces a tax f ∗xj . The profit
of firm i is given by (6) and the profit of firm j is given by (21). The tax acts as an increase
in the production costs of firm j only. We formulate in proposition 3 the main implications
of the excise tax policy.
Proposition 3. Under an excise tax proportional to the nutrient content of the low-
quality product, and relative to the benchmark case:
• The quality of the high-quality product decreases; the quality of the low-quality product
increases as long as the tax rate is not too high;
• The price of the low-quality product increases, whereas the price of the high-quality
product decreases;
• The high-quality firm is better off and the low-quality firm is worse off;
• The health index increases, the consumer surplus decreases when the tax is ‘small’ (it
can increase for some higher level of tax, depending on t), and welfare increases.
Proof. See the Appendix
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With the tax, firm j faces a cost increase that is proportional to the nutrient content
of its product. This provides this firm with an incentive to improve the quality (that is,
to lower the nutrient content xj) of its product. The response of firm i, facing a less
competitive firm (because its product is taxed), is to reduce the quality of its product
(that is, to increase xi). The change in the price of product i results from three elements:
a reduction in the cost due to the change in quality, a less differentiated market meaning
tougher competition, and an opposite effect, which is facing a less competitive firm. On the
whole, the first two effects dominate the third, and hence the price of product i decreases.
The change in the price of product j results from two elements: an increase in the cost
due to both the taxation and the increase in quality and an opposite effect resulting from
a less differentiated market. The first effect dominates the second, and hence pj increases.
The changes in profits are rather intuitive: the taxed firm is worse off, and the other firm
is better off.
The change in the health index results from three effects, the first two having a positive
impact and the third having a negative impact. First, the quality of product j increases.
Second, the indifference curve (2) shifts to the right. As a consequence, some consumers
switch from the low-quality good to the high-quality good. Third, the quality of product i
decreases. The impact of the first two effects dominates the impact of the third, explaining
the increase in the health index with the tax. Consumer surplus decreases as a consequence
of taxation, which in this context is fully transmitted to the consumer. It should be
noted, however, that at higher levels of taxation, an increase in the tax level might have a
(marginal) positive impact on consumer surplus. Welfare increases as a consequence of the
change in quality. As explained above, distortions in this model come from the location of
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the product. In this scenario, both the distortions with respect to product i and product
j are reduced. Then, welfare increases. It is, however, interesting to note that the quality
of the low-quality good reaches a maximum for f = 12(3t −
√
t(1 + 2t). If the tax rate
is higher than that value, then firm j no longer has sufficient incentives to continue to
increase the quality level. On the contrary, it begins to decrease the quality level of its
product. However, compared to the benchmark, the quality of product j is still higher.13
This is the result of both the increased competition from firm i, as the quality of product
i is still increasing, and the increase in the tax rate. For firm j, when the tax rate is high,
it becomes more profitable to lower the quality, thus relaxing competition and decreasing
production costs.
5.4 Robustness of results
An important assumption of the model relies on the link between the taste of the product
and its healthiness. In our case, based on the example of salt in foods, we assumed a full
link between the two. Then, the nutrient content of the product determines both its taste
and its healthiness. An alternative case is when there is complete independence between
the two dimensions. For example, it has been possible to replace most of TFAs with
other fatty acids in many foods without modifying significantly the taste of those foods.
TFAs were removed because of their adverse impact on health (for an analysis of this
case, see Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008). Finally, for other nutrients, an imperfect link
might exist. For example, for a given taste, a firm can design products within a range of
healthiness. Modifying the taste would imply modifying the range of possible healthiness.
13For high level of taxation (f ≥ fmax = 8t−2−
√
4−14t+28t2
2
), firm j chooses to produce the lowest level
of quality xj = 1, leading to a strong decrease in the health index.
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In that case, there still exists a link between the two properties, but this link is weaker than
the one we consider in this paper. In summary, in the relationship between the taste of a
product and its healthiness, depending on the nutrient, there exists a continuum of cases,
ranging from a complete link to a complete independence. In the following, we discuss the
possible implications of a weaker link between the taste of the product and its healthiness.
Let us first consider the case of complete independence between the two attributes.
Firms have now two levers for action: the product on the horizontal axis and the nutritional
quality on the vertical axis. A standard result from the literature is that products are
differentiated along one axis and not differentiated along the other axis (Neven and Thisse,
1989). Depending on the weight of the two characteristics in the utility function, two
equilibria can emerge. With horizontal dominance, that is when the location matters
more than the quality, firms choose maximal differentiation in their location and minimal
differentiation in quality. The reverse is true for vertical dominance.14 Interpreted in the
context of our model, with high transportation costs, firms should differentiate on taste but
not on healthiness. Conversely, with low transportation costs, firms should differentiate
on healthiness but not on taste. However, these results of maximal differentiation on one
dimension and minimal differentiation on the other one, emerge in a situation in which there
is no cost to modify the variety of the product or the quality of the product. As shown by
Olie Lauga and Ofek (2011), in a model with two vertically differentiated attributes and
in which quality is costly, firms exploit both dimensions to differentiate their products. In
the case of food, it is very likely that making healthier products is costly. Moreover, as
exemplified by the case of salt, modifying the taste might also affect the costs of production.
14This result generalizes in the case of n horizontal dimensions. In that case, firms differentiate only
along one dimension (Irmen and Thisse, 1998).
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Then, even with complete independence between the two attributes, an equilibrium in
which firms are differentiated along the two dimensions can emerge when the choice of
the attributes has a cost impact. This means that, in a benchmark case, even when firms
have some possibilities to act along the two dimensions, in equilibrium, products can be
differentiated both with respect to their taste and to their healthiness.
Interestingly, Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012) proposed a double-differentiation model
concerning nutrition and health issues. The goal of this model is somewhat different from
ours, as the authors sought to determine how new products that are nutritionally improved
can successfully emerge and enter the market in an asymmetrical context in which a low-
quality incumbent firm is already in the market. In this paper, the authors assume that the
two products have two independent characteristics, one related to taste (horizontal) and
another related to health (vertical). Thus, firms have two levers for action: the product
variety on the horizontal axis and the nutritional quality on the vertical axis. The authors
showed that when consumers have a low WTP for the health attribute, the standard
results occur as in Neven and Thisse (1989): Firms choose maximum differentiation on
the variety axis and minimum differentiation on the quality axis. However, when at least
some consumers have a higher WTP for the health attribute, then the entrant chooses a
higher quality for its product and some differentiation remains on the taste (horizontal)
axis. Products are differentiated along the two dimensions. This is another example in
which even with independent dimensions differentiation on both attributes can hold.
It is interesting to note that in this model, a move by the entrant firm on the horizontal
axis may be accompanied by a move on the vertical axis. For instance, when the quality
of the new product increases (vertical axis), the product may shift away from the other
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product on the variety axis: By doing so, the firm compensates for the increased production
cost caused by the quality improvement by lessening the competition intensity on the
horizontal axis. In such a competition setting, firms react not only by adjusting prices
and quality, but also by modifying the product variety available on the market and hence
the level of substituability between products. This is not possible in our model as the two
dimensions are fully dependant and firms have only one lever for action.
Let now consider the case of the MQS policy. In our model, imposing an MQS on
the low-quality good induces a change in the location and the quality of the high-quality
product. In the model designed by Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012), imposing an MQS is
equivalent to an exogenous change in the healthiness of the incumbent product without
modifying its taste. Using their framework, it can be shown that, the entrant firm modifies
the taste of its product but not the healthiness of the product.15 In a setting in which
taste and healthiness are imperfectly linked, the result would be intermediate. That is,
both the location and the healthiness of the high-quality good would change. In case
of horizontal dominance, it is likely that the change will be primarily on the horizontal
access. Conversely, in the case of vertical dominance, it is likely that the change will occur
in primarily on the vertical axis.
The same type of mechanism occurs in the case of a tax on the low-quality good. In
our model, the quality of the high-quality good decreases in response to the tax. In the
model designed by Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012), the quality of the high quality good is
not affected whereas the taste of the product is modified. In a setting in which taste and
healthiness are imperfectly linked, the result would be intermediate.
15For analytical results, refer to the Appendix.
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Then, in a context of complete independence between the taste and healthiness of a
product, firms are likely to respond to a policy by adjusting one characteristic and leaving
the other unchanged. Our model represents the other extreme case in which the taste
and healthiness of the products are perfectly linked. Then, any change in characteristics
affects both dimensions. In the more general case of an imperfect link between these two
attributes, it is likely that changes induced by a policy would affect both dimensions.
6 Policy Comparison
The three policy interventions analyzed in the previous sections clearly differ in their im-
pacts on market segmentation:
• The MQS policy increases both qualities, increases the demand for the low-quality
product and decreases the demand for the high-quality product;
• The tax policy on two products does not change the demands but both qualities
increase;
• The tax policy on one product increases the quality of the low-quality product (as
long as the tax rate is not too high), decreases the quality of the high-quality product,
and increases the demand for the high-quality product.
A common feature of the three policies is to provide incentives to the low-quality firm
to increase its product’s healthfulness, that is, to move left. We have shown that all of
the three instruments - MQS, a linear excise tax on the two products, and a linear excise
tax on the low-quality product - ameliorate the health index. Nevertheless, depending on
the instruments, the effects on the other parameters (quality of the high-quality product,
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demands, and prices) are not identical. The MQS policy increases the consumer surplus
whereas the tax policies decrease it. A linear excise tax on the two products deteriorates
social welfare defined by a populist social planner whereas, as long as the tax rate is not
too high, it increases social welfare defined by a paternalistic social planner. Both the MQS
and the linear excise tax on one product increase social welfare whether welfare is defined
by a populist or a paternalistic social planner.
To go a step further in the analysis and to determine which policy is the most powerful
in achieving the regulator’s objective, we now consider the optimal policies that maximize
the social welfare, defined by either a populist or a paternalist social planner. Our goal is to
determine which policy is chosen depending on the type of social planner. We only consider
the MQS-based and the linear excise tax on the low-quality product policies, and exclude
the linear excise tax on the two products as we already know that it is never chosen by the
populist social planner. Finally, we compare these optimal policies with information-based
policies.
6.1 Optimal policy
We now seek to determine the optimal tax rates and the optimal MQS chosen by the social
planners to maximize social welfare and compare the final market outcomes of these optimal
policies. The values are numerically computed using Mathematica (see the Appendix for
a detailed description of the procedure).
Note that the results depend on the value of the transportation cost t that expresses the
strength of consumers preferences for product taste. We have already mentioned (through
expression (13)) that we only consider in this paper rather large values of t, and then
situations in which it is not easy for consumers to move on the horizontal axis. Tables 2
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t = 3/4 t = 9/10
BM Tax MQS BM Tax MQS
f = 0.479 x¯ = 0.598 f = 0.724 x¯ = 0.608
xi 0.050 0.200 0.000 0.018 0.232 0.000
xj 0.950 0.908 0.598 0.982 0.938 0.608
pi 1.127 1.028 0.849 1.350 1.212 0.935
pj 0.677 0.794 0.630 0.868 1.034 0.735
di 0.500 0.667 0.388 0.500 0.722 0.398
dj 0.500 0.333 0.612 0.500 0.278 0.602
p˜ 0.901 0.950 0.715 1.109 1.163 0.815
pii 0.338 0.472 0.135 0.434 0.663 0.173
pij 0.338 0.118 0.336 0.434 0.098 0.396
H 0.500 0.564 0.634 0.500 0.572 0.634
pii + pij 0.675 0.590 0.471 0.868 0.761 0.569
CS 1.328 1.320 1.586 1.096 1.097 1.477
CSl 0.602 0.590 0.714 0.485 0.477 0.659
CSh 0.727 0.731 0.872 0.610 0.620 0.817
SW1 2.003 2.056 2.057 1.964 2.047 2.046
Tax - 0.145 - - 0.189 -
v=2; BM stands for benchmark; Tax stands for tax on the bad product.
Table 2: Comparison of optimal policies designed by a populist social planner.
and 3 show that optimal policies also depend on this parameter. They display the market
outcomes of optimal policies chosen by the two social planners for two values of t : t = 3/4
and t = 9/10.
Concerning first the populist social planner (Table 2), we find that:
- When the transportation cost is moderately high (t = 3/4), the MQS-based policy is
preferred to the tax policy, as it allows for higher social welfare. Compared to the tax policy,
the variation in consumers’ surplus offsets the firms profit losses and the tax collected.
Consumers benefit from a strong average price reduction. The public health output is also
higher under the MQS. In that case, compared to the benchmark, the market equilibrium
is as follows: a smaller market share for a slightly improved high-quality product and a
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t = 3/4 t = 9/10
BM Tax MQS BM Tax MQS
f = 0.479 x¯ = 0.381 f = 0.724 x¯ = 0.418
xi 0.050 0.200 0.000 0.018 0.232 0.000
xj 0.950 0.908 0.381 0.982 0.938 0.418
pi 1.127 1.028 0.689 1.350 1.212 0.763
pj 0.677 0.794 0.578 0.868 1.034 0.659
di 0.500 0.667 0.329 0.500 0.722 0.349
dj 0.500 0.333 0.671 0.500 0.278 0.651
p˜ 0.901 0.950 0.614 1.109 1.163 0.695
pii 0.338 0.472 0.062 0.434 0.663 0.092
pij 0.338 0.118 0.259 0.434 0.098 0.319
H 0.500 0.564 0.744 0.500 0.572 0.728
pii + pij 0.675 0.590 0.321 0.868 0.761 0.411
CS 1.528 1.563 2.051 1.301 1.351 1.951
CSl 0.727 0.752 1.010 0.617 0.651 0.961
CSh 0.802 0.811 1.041 0.684 0.7000 0.990
SW2 2.203 2.298 2.373 2.169 2.300 2.361
Tax - 0.145 - - 0.189 -
v=2; BM stands for benchmark; Tax stands for tax on the bad product.
In this table, consumer surplus is evaluated from the paternalistic point of view, that is assuming λ = 1.
Table 3: Comparison of optimal policies designed by a paternalistic social planner
38
larger market share for a strongly improved low-quality product.
- When the transportation cost is high (t = 9/10), the tax policy is preferred to the
MQS-based policy. The market equilibrium is radically different because, compared to the
benchmark, it relies on the following: a slight improvement of the low-quality product; a
significant decrease in the quality of the high-quality product; and an important move by
consumers from the low- (slightly upgraded) to the high-quality product (strongly down-
graded), caused by the decrease in the price of the high-quality product. Note that the
consumers’ surplus is much lower than under the MQS as the average price is much higher.
This is a consequence of the tax which is fully transmitted to the consumer in the context
of covered market. In addition, the public health output is lower than under the MQS.
It is as if, given strong resistance by consumers, the best solution was to not too strongly
improve the average quality of the market (like under the MQS), favor consumers switching
toward a downgraded high-quality product and maximize the social welfare through tax
collection. Note that, in this case, the optimal policy is not the one that maximizes the
public health output.
In the case of the paternalist social planner (Table 3), the results change significantly.
Indeed, whatever the value of t, the MQS-based policy is preferred. This is because the
MQS policy improves significantly the quality of the low-quality product, thus lowering
the distortion on this quality while the distortion on the quality of the high quality good
slightly increases. The tax policy reduces both distortions but to a small extent, which
explains why the welfare increase is lower. Under the MQS, even if many consumers switch
from the high- to the low-quality product, the average quality of the market is substantially
improved thanks to the large increase in the quality of the low-quality product. In all cases,
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the public health output increases. Compared to the benchmark and the tax policy, the
social welfare is increased thanks to the high increase in the consumers’ surplus (mainly
caused by the decrease in the average market price), and despite the drop in the firms’
profits.16
Finally, two additional results may be highlighted. First, compared to the benchmark,
the tax policy leads to only small variation in the consumer’ surplus. The increase in the
social welfare is mainly caused by the amount of the collected tax that offsets the firms’
profit losses (note that this amount could be devoted to information campaigns leading to
additional public health benefits).17
Second, regarding the distributional effects, the two instruments are not identical. To
measure these effects, we divide consumers into two groups depending on their health
awareness. Consumers characterized by 1/2 < λ ≤ 1 are health-conscious consumers, and
consumers characterized by 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/2 are non-health-conscious consumers. In the case
of a populist social planner, the consumer surplus of non-health-conscious consumers is
always lower under the tax policy than in the benchmark case, whatever the transporta-
tion cost. The tax policy is then clearly regressive in this case, whereas the MQS-based
policy increases the surpluses of both consumer types. The reason is that the MQS leads
16As explained above, a ministry of health might use this paternalist social planner program. A more
extreme view of the behavior of a ministry of health would be to consider that his objective is to maximize
the health index, thus ignoring the taste dimension as well as firms profit. In such a case, the optimal policy
would be to set a MQS x¯ = 0. Thus, the health index is defined as (1 − xi)Di + (1 − xj)Dj . As shown
above, when the MQS is sufficiently restrictive, the best reply of firm i is to choose the maximum quality,
that is xi = 0. In that case, it is easy to show that a MQS x¯ = 0 maximizes the health index, which takes
the maximal theoretical value of one. Such a solution is at the limit of the model (in particular because
the high quality firm can no longer differentiate his product from the product of the other firm). The main
result from this perspective of maximizing the health index is that a MQS is preferred to taxation.
17Note that, in the case of elastic demand, if the market were not covered, the change in welfare due to
the tax would be smaller, as an increase in the price would cause deadweight losses which is not the case
in our setting in which the market is covered.
40
to a strong increase in the quality of the low-quality product that is cheaper (and even
cheaper than in the benchmark, as the competition intensity increases). In the case of the
paternalist social planer, the two policies are progressive, as they increase both consumers
surpluses and more strongly those of non-health-conscious consumers.
6.2 Information policy versus policies changing the market environment
Thus far, we have considered policies targeting changes in the market environment facing
consumers. The goal is to favor health benefits even for non-informed and non-health-
conscious consumers. In practice, however, public planners often develop information poli-
cies. In the following, we analyze whether market environment policies perform better,
in terms of health and welfare impacts, than policies exclusively based on education and
information campaigns.
To determine to what extent information-based policies may be more or less effective
than policies changing the market environment, we construct the following scenarios. First,
we consider a situation in which no consumer is aware of the health impact of nutrient intake
(λ = 0) and the transportation cost is high (t = 0.9). From this initial starting point, policy
makers may decide to implement an MQS-based policy (if the planner is paternalist) or a
tax policy (if the planner is populist) without seeking for changes in consumer perceptions of
the health impacts of food intakes. On the contrary, policy makers can decide to implement
information campaigns to make consumers more aware of the health impacts of food intakes.
In this latter case, we assume that all consumers become fully aware (λ = 1) thanks to
a perfectly efficient information campaign (we do not take into account the cost of this
information campaign). By definition, in this case, the social welfare is the same for the
populist and paternalist social planners.
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λ = 0 λ = 1
Populist Social Planner No Policy Tax: f = 0.770 MQS: x¯ = 0.821 No other policy
Health index 0.381 0.385 0.461 0.619
Welfare (SW1) 1.776 1.852 1.794 2.276
Paternalistic Social Planner No Policy Tax: f = 0.686 MQS: x¯ = 0.428 No other policy
Health index 0.381 0.423 0.683 0.619
Welfare (SW2) 2.157 2.264 2.366 2.276
t=0.9, v=2; MQS and tax are chosen to maximize the related welfare.
Table 4: Comparison of the impact of market policies versus information policy
Table 4 displays public health outcomes and social welfare. Compared to the initial
starting point, both the tax policy and the MQS policy improve welfare and health out-
comes. However for the paternalist social planner who chooses the MQS policy, social
welfare and health index increase considerably more under this policy than under an in-
formation policy. In fact, the quality distortions in equilibrium, discussed in Section 5,
still hold with perfectly informed consumers: The quality of the high-quality product is
too high, and the quality of the low-quality product is too low. In other words, under an
information policy, distortions caused by market power still exist and policies targeting
changes in product quality may be required.
In the case of the populist social planner, it turns out that an efficient information
campaign allows for a higher health index and social welfare than the tax policy (with
unconscious consumers). The choice between the two then depends on the cost of an
information campaign. If it is not too expensive to make all consumers aware of health
dimensions, the information policy must be prioritized. If it is costly, the tax policy has to
be chosen.
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7 Conclusion
In this article, we propose an original model of product differentiation intended to estimate
to what extent tax- and standard-based policies can contribute to improving the nutritional
quality of foods and, in turn, the health status of the population. On the supply side, a
single characteristic, that is, the content of the product in some ‘unhealthy’ nutrient is used
to define the product. On the demand side, this characteristic affects the consumers utility
in two ways: first through its impact on product taste, and second through its impact on
health. The main contribution of our analysis is to evaluate, in this setting, market impacts
of alternative policies, integrating strategic reactions of firms both in terms of prices and
product characteristics. In addition we estimate social welfare impacts as defined by either
a populist or a paternalist social planner. A populist social planner evaluates the consumer
surplus on the basis of the utility function of consumers, as he does not fully incorporate into
the consumer surplus the ‘true’ health impact of the bad nutrient intakes. Alternatively, a
paternalistic social planner fully integrates the health impact of consumption.
In the absence of any policy intervention, we find that in equilibrium (i) products are
more differentiated than in the standard horizontal differentiation model - this is due to
the consumers’ heterogeneity in both health and taste dimensions; and (ii) for a welfare-
maximizing planner, the two products are too differentiated- the quality of the high-quality
product is too high, and the quality of the low-quality product is too low. This distortion
may justify public policy interventions intended to influence quality decisions made by
firms to restore an optimal market segmentation.
Among the three policy options analyzed, the MQS policy and the taxation of the low-
quality product are the most preferred by a social planner. Under an MQS, both firms
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improve the quality of the products and product differentiation decreases, as it is more
costly for the high-quality firm to improve the quality of its product. This policy improves
the health outcome and is welfare increasing whether welfare is evaluated by a populist or
a paternalist social planner. Taxation of the low-quality product also improves health and
welfare. This policy induces a change in the quality of products, which is consistent with
the social planner’s perspective. However, this policy leads to an increase in the average
price of the product whereas the MQS policy decreases the average price.
The definition of an optimal policy depends on the consumers’ willingness to accept
taste modifications and the type of social planner. If the transportation cost is moderately
high, the MQS policy is chosen by the two social planners. If the transportation cost is
very high, the populist social planner chooses to tax the low-quality product whereas the
paternalist social planner still prefers the MQS-based policy.
Information policies improving the consumers’ perception of health impacts of bad
nutrient intakes may lead to better public health outcomes than the benchmark. However,
for a paternalist social planner, an MQS-based policy always allows for higher levels of
welfare (and the health index) than an information policy alone. The main reason is that,
even with consumers who are perfectly informed of the health impacts of food choices,
market segmentation is not optimal and quality distortions still prevail. For a populist
social planner, the results are mixed and depend on the cost of the information policy. If
the information policy is not too expensive, this policy must be prioritized; otherwise, the
tax policy performs better than the information policy alone.
Overall, our results have two important consequences for nutritional policy design.
Whereas some policy makers are sometimes reluctant to go beyond consumer information
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and education interventions, our analysis suggests that policies targeting changes in food
quality must always complement information policies. A large part of the public debates
related to nutrition and health policies has focused on fiscal interventions (fat tax, taxes on
soft beverages). Our analysis does not suggest prioritizing such instruments, except in the
case of a populist social planner in presence of strong taste resistances among consumers.
Even in this case, note that consumer surplus does not increase significantly. In fact, the tax
policy is regressive, thus lowering the surplus of the less-health-conscious consumers while
increasing the surplus of the more-health-conscious consumers. Moreover, we also show that
if the tax rate is too high, firms’ strategic reactions may lead to unintended consequences.
Thus, an excessively high tax rate leads the low-quality firm to degrade the quality of its
product, which leads to a strong negative impact on the health outcome of the policy. It
should be stressed that in all other cases, standard-based policies should be prioritized.
Practical difficulties of such policies that could however limit their implementation would
have to be analyzed in greater detail.
These results must be considered while taking into account some limitations of our
model. An important assumption of the model was the market coverage assumption.
Thus, we assumed that the global demand is fixed. The demand for each firm is elastic,
as consumers switch from one product to another, but the overall demand is inelastic. In
practice, this means that we implicitly consider markets for products that are consumed
by all consumers, which are thus difficult to substitute in the diet. The limit is mainly
related to the impact of an increase in the quality of the ‘bad’ product, which is the
cheaper product. The tax policies analyzed above lead to an increase in the price of the
low-quality good. We assume here that this does not discourage consumption as every
45
consumer continues to buy one of the products on the market. In practice, it is possible
that some consumers will cease consuming this product. This would affect their surplus,
but this would also affect the profit of the firm selling that product, thus limiting the
positive impact of the policy. Conversely, in the case of the MQS policy, its interest could
be larger in a context of elastic demand, as this policy leads to a decrease in the price of
the low-quality good. A second limitation of the model is related to the assumption that
a consumer buys one unit of a product. By doing so, we do not capture an individual
quantity effect that might occur when the characteristic of the product changes. It is
possible that a decrease in the content of a ‘bad’ nutrient generates an increase in the
quantity consumed, as consumers might believe that they ’can’ eat more of the product
because it is now safer. Addressing this second issue requires a radical change in the model
to endogeneize quantity decisions by consumers.
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8 Appendix
All results are obtained using Mathematica.
8.1 Determination of the Perfect Nash equilibrium
8.1.1 Demand functions and associated conditions
Given the indifference line (2), we define demands as functions of pi, pj , xi, xj . We define
x0 the location of the indifferent consumer with λ = 0 and x1 the location of the indifferent
consumer with λ = 1. We have x1 − x0 = 1/2t ≤ 1 (as t ≥ 1/2). Depending on the value
of x0 and x1, demand is written as:
• Case 1: x0 ≥ 0 and x1 ≤ 1 : This is the standard case and we have
D1i =
1
2t [t(xi + xj ] +
pj−pi
xj−xi +
1
2 ]
• Case 2: x0 ≤ 0 and x1 ≤ 1 : Demand for product i is reduced to consumers with a
‘small’ x and a ‘high’ λ. We have D2i =
1
4t [1 + t(xi + xj ] +
pj−pi
xj−xi ]
2
• Case 3: 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 1 and x1 ≥ 1 : In this case, demand for product j is reduced to
consumers with a ‘high’ x and a ‘low’ λ. We have D3j =
1
4t [2t− t(xi + xj ]−
pj−pi
xj−xi ]
2
We also use Di +Dj = 1 to define the demand of the other product, and we exclude cases
in which Di = 0 or Dj = 0.
For each of the three cases defined above, we determine the Nash price equilibrium in
the second stage of the game, that is given the characteristics xi and xj . We denote p
l
i,
l ∈ {1, 2, 3} the price equilibrium for product i in case l. In case 1, we find that:
pi(pj) =
pj
2
+
1
4
[1−3xi+x2i+xj ]+
t
2
[x2j−x2i ]pj(pi) =
pi
2
+
1
4
[1−3xj+x2j+xi]+
t
2
[2(xj−xi)−(x2j−x2i ]
from which we deduce the prices at the second-stage equilibrium (p1i is given in (9) and p
2
j
is given in (10). Note that both reaction functions are upward sloping.
Using the expressions of the equilibrium prices at the second stage, we rewrite the
indifferent consumer line, which is now a function of t, xi and xj and deduce the following
conditions on xi and xj :
• Case 1: 4(1−t)1+2t ≤ xi + xj ≤ 2(4t−1)1+2t
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• Case 2: 0 ≤ xi + xj ≤ 4(1−t)1+2t
• Case 3: 2(4t−1)1+2t ≤ xi + xj ≤ 2
In the following, we will use these conditions as well as 0 ≤ xi ≤ xj ≤ 1. Given the
specification of the model, firm i produces the high quality, firm j produces the low quality
and qualities are in the range [0,1].
8.1.2 Existence of an equilibrium
Solving analytically the model in ‘case 1’ demand, leads to the best reply functions (in
characteristic, that is in location) which are given by:
xi(xj) =
xj
3
+
1− 4t
3(1 + 2t)
xj(xi) =
xi
3
+
1 + 8t
3(1 + 2t)
from which we deduce the equilibrium locations given by (11) and (12). Let’s denote the
profit of firm i for this potential equilibrium piBi . To prove that the pair of locations defined
by (11) and (12) is chosen at the perfect Nash equilibrium, we have to prove that xBi is
the best reply in quality to xBj , ∀xi ≤ xBj and that xBj is the best reply in quality to
xBi , ∀xj ≥ xBi .
We now present, the method used to analyse if xBi is the best reply in quality to x
B
j .
First, given the way we determined xBi and x
B
j , x
B
i is the best reply to x
B
j as long as the
demands are defined by (D1i , D
1
j ). Second, let suppose we are in ‘case 2’ demand. Given
xBj =
1+5t
2(1+2t) , case 2 is possible only if t ≤ 7/13 as xj ≥ 4(1−t)1+2t for t ≥ 7/13. Finally, it
is easy to check that when xi is sufficiently large, we face case 3 for demand. Thus, for
t ∈ [1/2, 7/13] we have to determine if xBi is the best reply to xBj with demands defined by
case 2 or 3 (obviously depending on the value of xi). For t ∈ [7/13, 1] we have to determine
if xBi is the best reply to x
B
j with demands defined by ‘case 3’ only. A similar analysis is
developed to analyse if xBj is the best reply to x
B
i (given x
B
i , it also happens that both
‘case 2’ and ‘case 3’ demand need to be explored when t ≤ 7/13 and only ‘case 2’ demand
when t ≥ 7/13). In the following we detail the method used in one situation. Then, we
sum-up the results found for the other cases, using a similar method.
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Assume t ≥ 7/13, we have to determine the profit of producer i, when the demand is
defined by (D3i , D
3
j ). Prices at the second stage are p
3
i and p
3
j . x
B
i is the best reply to x
B
j
iff :
pii[p
3
i (xi, x
B
j ), p
3
j (xi, x
B
j )] ≤ piBi , ∀xi ∈ [
2(4t− 1)
(1 + 2t)
− xBj , xBj ] (22)
The restriction on xi comes from the conditions on the demand in case 3. We use Math-
ematica to test if (22) is true. We determine p3i (xi, x
B
j ) and p
3
j (xi, x
B
j ) in function of t from
which we determine pii[p
3
i (xi, x
B
j ), p
3
j (xi, x
B
j )] which is now written pi
3
i (xi, x
B
j ) . Denoting
x¯i the lower value of xi, that is
2(4t−1)
(1+2t) − xBj = 11t−52(1+2t) . We first determine pi3i (x¯i, xBj )− piBi
and find (numerically) that it is negative ∀t ∈ [7/13, 1]. Then we determine ∂pi
3
i (xi,x
B
j )
∂xi
and
find (numerically) that it is negative ∀xi ∈ [x¯i, xBj ]. Thus, pi3i (xi, xBj ) decreases with xi
(note that when xi = x
B
j then the profit of firm i is 0). This proves that (22) is true
∀t ∈ [7/13, 1] meaning that xBi is the best reply in quality to xBj . A similar analysis leads
to the conclusion that xBj is the best reply in quality to x
B
i . We now sum-up the results of
the different cases:
• t ∈ [7/13, 1]: the couple of quality xBi , xBj is a perfect Nash equilibrium.
• t ∈ [1/2, 7/13]
– t ∈ [1/2, 0.524766]: the couple of quality xBi , xBj is not an equilibrium. Thus in
this range we find that xi = 0 is the best reply to x
B
j . We also find that xj = 1
is the best reply to xBi . The value of the bound is solved numerically.
– t ∈ [0.524766, 7/13]: the couple of quality xBi , xBj is an equilibrium.
8.1.3 Unicity of the equilibrium
For t > 0.524766, we proved that xBi , x
B
j constitutes a perfect Nash equilibrium. We now
have to determine if there are other equilibria. Let us consider the ‘case 2’ demand. This
corresponds to xi + xj ≤ 4(1−t)1+2t . We first determine the second stage price equilibrium
p2i (xi, xj) and p
2
j (xi, xj). As it is not possible to find analytically the optimal qualities, we
first look for the best reply of producer i to a given xj . We get 3 possible candidates. It
turns out that none of these candidates are in the range [0, xj ]. However, for a given xj ,
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the profit of firm i decreases with xi when xi ∈ [0, xj ]. We thus find that the best reply of
producer i is x2i (xj) = 0, ∀t ∈ [1/2, 1]. We now have to determine the best reply of producer
j to xi = 0, that is x
2
j (0). To do so, we compute the profit of firm j, given the price at
the second stage, with xi = 0 and maximizes it wrt xj . We get 7 solutions. It turns out
that only one solution is in the range [0, 1]. We also checked the conditions on the demand
(xi+xj = xj ≤ 4(1−t)1+2t ). We find that there exists a solution only for t ∈ [12 ,
√
33−1
8 ' 0.593].
The couple of qualities {0, x2j (0)} is an equilibrium, if the profit producer j gets when
playing x2j (0) is larger than what he would get by playing x
1
j (0), defining it as his best
response assuming the demand is defined by ‘case 1’ (note that we do not have to explore
the ‘case 3’ demand as this case is not compatible with xi = 0). If the profit of producer
j when playing x1j (0) is greater than the one he gets by playing x
2
j (0), then the couple of
qualities {0, x2j (0)} is not an equilibrium as the best reply of producer j to xi = 0 is in the
‘case 1’ demand (and in that case xi is no longer the best reply to xj). Applying the above
analysis, we find that there exists an equilibrium in the ‘case 2’ demand when t < 0.58934.
(we are only able to solve it numerically). We develop the same analysis in the ‘case 3’
demand. We find a similar result that there exists an equilibrium with xj = 1 under the
same conditions. To sum up:
• t ∈ [1/2, 0.524766] We have two equilibria: an equilibrium in ‘case 2’ demand with
xi = 0, and an equilibrium in ‘case 3’ demand with xj = 1
• t ∈ [0.524766, 0.58934] We have three equilibria: {xBi , xBj }, and the two equilibria
defined above.
• t ∈ [0.58934, 1] We have a unique perfect Nash equilibrium {xBi , xBj }
8.2 Characterization of the Perfect Nash Equilibrium (t ∈ [t¯, 1])
8.2.1 Equilibrium prices, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare
Substituting xBi , x
B
j into the second stage prices (Eq. (11) and (12)), we get the equilibrium
prices:
pBi =
1 + 10t+ 49t2 + 48t3
8(1 + 2t)2
, (23)
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pBj =
1− 2t+ 25t2 + 48t3
8(1 + 2t)2
. (24)
To get the demand at equilibrium, substitute (23), (24) and xBi , x
B
j into (3), (4), we
get:
Di = Dj =
1
2
. (25)
From which we deduce:
Πi = Πj =
3t2
2(1 + 2t)
. (26)
The distance between the two firms provides a measure of the product differentiation.
We have xBj − xBi = 3t1+2t . The health index is computed by substituting (11), (12), and
(25) into (7): hij =
1
2
8.2.2 Consumer surplus
Consumer surplus is written as:
CS =
∫ x0
0
∫ 1
0
Uidλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ 1
λ(x)
Uidλdx
+
∫ 1
x1
∫ 1
0
Ujdλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ λ(x)
0
Ujdλdx,
(27)
with the indifference curve given by: λ(x) = 2tx− t(xj + xi)− pj−pixj−xi . By substituting the
equilibrium values of xBi , x
B
j , p
B
i and p
B
j , we get:
CS =
9 + 8t− 170t2
48(1 + 2t)
. (28)
8.2.3 Social welfare
Welfare, for a populist social planner, is defined as SW = Πi + Πj + CS. From which, we
deduce:
SW1 =
9 + 8t− 26t2
48(1 + 2t)
. (29)
Welfare, for a paternalistic social planner, is defined as :
SW2 = Πi + Πj +
∫ x0
0
∫ 1
0
U ′idλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ 1
λ(x)
U ′idλdx
+
∫ 1
x1
∫ 1
0
U ′jdλdx+
∫ x1
x0
∫ λ(x)
0
U ′jdλdx.
(30)
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By substituting the equilibrium values of xBi , x
B
j , p
B
i and p
B
j , we get:
SW2 =
15 + 32t− 26t2
48(1 + 2t)
(31)
8.2.4 Qualities are strategic complements
As discussed above, the best reply functions in characteristic are given by:
xi(xj) =
xj
3
+
1− 4t
3(1 + 2t)
xj(xi) =
xi
3
+
1 + 8t
3(1 + 2t)
Both best reply functions are upward sloping, meaning that the locations xi and xj are
strategic complements.
8.3 Optimal qualities for the social planner
Given (14), we have
SW1 =
xj − xi + 3t(2− 2xj + x2j − x2i ) + 4t2(3x0(xj − xi)(1− x0)− 1− 3x2j
12t
−1− x
2
i
2
(x0 + 1/4t)−
1− x2j
2
(1− 1/4t− x0)
(32)
Maximising this function wrt x0 leads to the optimal x0 =
(xi+xj)(1+2t)−2
4t . Using the
optimal x0, we then maximise the welfare function wrt xi and xj leading to the optimal
qualities.
We use the same methodology to determine the optimal qualities in the case of the
paternalistic social planner.
8.4 Instrument: MQS
Stage 2 of the game is not modified and thus (9), (10) apply. xSi is found by maximising
Πi(p
∗
i (xi, x¯), p
∗
j (xi, x¯)) over xi. The optimal solution is given by (19). Following the same
method as for the benchmark, we deduce prices, demands, profits, health index, consumer
surplus and welfare at the equilibrium. They are obviously function of x¯ which is exoge-
nously set. We provide in the following the analytical expressions of all those variables.
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8.4.1 Equilibrium prices
pMi =
[27 + 18(x¯− 4)(1 + 2t) + [59− 38x¯+ 11x¯2 + 16t(1 + x¯2)](1 + 2t)2)]
54(1 + 2t)2
(33)
pMj =
[36 + (1 + 2t)[−11− 46x¯+ 19x¯2 + 8t(7− 2x¯)(1 + x¯)]]
54(1 + 2t)
(34)
and
∂pMi
∂x¯
|xBj =
16t2 + (3t− 1)
6(1 + 2t)
> 0
∂pMj
∂x¯
|xBj =
(t− 1)
2(1 + 2t)
< 0
8.4.2 Demands
DMi =
−1 + 4t+ 2x¯(1 + 2t)
18t
(35)
DMj =
1 + 14t− 2x¯(1 + 2t)
18t
(36)
and
∂DMi
∂x¯
|xBj =
1 + 2t
9t
> 0
∂DMj
∂x¯
|xBj = −
1 + 2t
9t
< 0
8.4.3 Profits
ΠMi =
[2x¯− 1 + 4t(x¯+ 1)]3
486t(1 + 2t)
(37)
ΠMj =
(1 + 14t− x¯(4t+ 2))2(−1 + 4t+ x¯(2 + 4t))
486t(1 + 2t)
(38)
and
∂ΠMi
∂x¯
|xBj = t > 0
∂ΠMj
∂x¯
|xBj = −
t
3
< 0
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8.4.4 Health index
hMij =
1 + 46t+ 124t2 + 4x¯2(1 + 2t)2 − 2x¯(2 + 23t+ 38t2)
54t(1 + 2t)
(39)
and
∂hMij
∂x¯
|xBj = −
1
3
< 0
8.4.5 Consumer surplus
CSM =
1
3888t(1 + 2t)
(−31− 24x¯2(2 + 49t)(1 + 2t)2 + 32x¯3(1 + 2t)3+
6x¯(1 + 2t)[13 + 4t(49 + 58t)]− 4t[−75 + 4t(3 + 650t)]
(40)
∂CSM
∂x¯
|xBj =
1
72t
− t < 0
8.4.6 Social welfare
SW1M =
1
3888t(1 + 2t)
(−47− 3616t3 − 120x¯2(2 + 13t)(1 + 2t)2 + 160x¯3(1 + 2t)3+
6x¯(29 + 318t+ 1104t2 + 1168t3)− 1104t2 + 204t)
(41)
and
∂SW1M
∂x¯
|xBj =
1
72t
− t
3
< 0
SW2M =
1
3888t(1 + 2t)
(−47− 3616t3 − 24x¯2(4 + 65t)(1 + 2t)2 + 160x¯3(1 + 2t)3+
6x¯(−13 + 6t+ 648t2 + 1168t3) + 3360t2 + 1644t)
(42)
and
∂SW2M
∂x¯
|xBj = −
1
6
− 1
72t
− t
3
< 0
8.4.7 Optimal MQS
We first study the case of the populist social planner. We have proved that ∂SW1
M
∂x¯ |xBj < 0.
Then there exists a restrictive MQS which improves welfare. To determine the optimal
MQS, we need to check some conditions when optimizing the welfare function over x¯.
Thus, three constraints need to hold: xi ≥ 0, x0 ≥ 0, and x1 ≤ 1 . The second and third
constraint ensure that demands are defined by ‘case 1’. Given the prices and the qualities
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at the equilibrium, the first condition is equivalent to x¯ ≥ 4t−11+2t , the second condition is
equivalent to x¯ ≥ 11−8t4(1+2t) , and the third condition is always satisfied. The first two con-
straints are identical for t = 5/8.
Let first consider the case, t ≤ 5/8, then condition x0 ≥ 0 restricts the existence of an
equilibrium to x¯ ∈ [ 11−8t4(1+2t) , xBj ] and xMi is given by (19). It is easy to show that SW1M
decreases over [ 11−8t4(1+2t) , x
B
j ]. Then, the optimal MQS when demand is defined by case 1,
is given by x¯ = 11−8t4(1+2t) . We then deduce the value of the surplus at the optimal MQS,
conditional on being in ‘case 1’ demand. Thus, it is possible that an equilibrium exists
in ‘case 2’ demand. This is possible as in the present case (as opposed to the benchmark
case), the quality of product j is bounded. Using the expression of ‘case 2’ demand as
well as the associated second stage price equilibrium, we found that an equilibrium with
xi = 0 exists. That is to say that the MQS can be defined for lower values than
11−8t
4(1+2t) . We
then determine the welfare in this case and compare it to the one obtained previously. It
happens that there exists a more restrictive MQS which leads to a higher welfare, meaning
that the optimal MQS is defined in ‘case 2’ demand.
Let now consider the case, t ≥ 5/8. The condition on xi ≥ 0 is the most restrictive and
xMi is given by (19) as long as x¯ ≥ 4t−11+2t . Otherwise, we have xMi = 0 and we need to check if
a type 2 condition (x0 ≥ 0) is satisfied (given xMi = 0): we have x0 ≥ 0⇔ x¯ ≥ 4(1−t)1+2t . Let’s
now determine the sign of ∂SW1
M
∂x¯ |x¯= 4t−11+2t . We find that it is negative for all t ∈ [5/8, 1].
We also find that ∂SW1
M
∂x¯ < 0 ∀x¯ ∈ [4t−11+2t , xBj ]. Then, the optimal MQS is determined by
∂SW1M (0,x¯)
∂x¯ = 0. We get MQS
∗ = 2(5+38t+56t
2−
√
(1+2t)2(−5+70t+304t2))
(15(1+2t)2
. This is an ‘interior’
solution (x¯ > 4(1−t)1+2t ) as long as t ≥ 33+
√
137
68 ' 0.6574.
When t is lower than this threshold, then the optimal MQS, providing the demand is
defined by ‘case 1’, is given by 4(1−t)1+2t . Finally, we check (numerically) if a more restrictive
MQS leads to higher surplus considering the case 2 demand. Focusing on two specific cases
(t = 3/4 and t = 9/10), we find that in both cases the optimal MQS is defined for the case
1 demand.
We use the same methodology to find the optimal MQS defined by a paternalistic social
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planner. We focus on t ≥ 5/8. As for the populist social planner, we find that the optimal
MQS is determined by ∂SW1
M (0,x¯)
∂x¯ = 0. We getMQS
∗ = 2(2+32t+56t
2−
√
(1+2t)2(19+82t+304t2))
(15(1+2t)2
.
This is an ‘interior’ solution (x¯ > 4(1−t)1+2t ) as long as t ≥ 37+
√
213
68 ' 0.758743. When t is
lower than this threshold, then the optimal MQS, providing the demand is defined by ‘case
1’, is given by 4(1−t)1+2t . Finally, we check (numerically) if a more restrictive MQS leads to
higher surplus considering the ‘case 2’ demand. Focusing on two specific cases (t = 3/4
and t = 9/10), we find that for t = 3/4, the optimal MQS is defined for the ‘case 2’ demand
whereas for t = 9/10 the optimal MQS is defined for the ‘case 1’ demand.
8.5 Linear Excise Tax - Scenario 1: Taxing both products
The analysis is similar to the analysis of the benchmark case. To determine the equilibrium,
we use the new profit functions defined by (20) and (21).
8.5.1 Optimal qualities
xfi =
1− 2f − t
2(1 + 2t)
< xBi
xfj =
1− 2f + 5t
2(1 + 2t)
< xBj
We also deduce that
xfj − xfi =
3t
1 + 2t
= xBj − xBi
8.5.2 Equilibrium prices
pfi = p
B
i +
f(8t− f − 2t− 4tf − 2t2 + 2)
2(1 + 2t))2
pfj = p
B
j +
f(8t− f − 2t− 4tf + 5t2 + 2)
2(1 + 2t)2
We have pfi − pBi > 0, pfj − pBj > 0 and pfj − pBj > pfi − pBi .
8.5.3 Demands and Profits
Dfi = D
f
j =
1
2
= DBi = D
B
j
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It is easy to check that the line defining indifferent consumers is λ = 12 + t(2x − 1) which
is identical to that in the benchmark case. Note that the consumer (12 ,
1
2) belongs to this
line.
Πfi = Π
f
j =
3t2
2(1 + 2t)
= ΠBi = Π
B
j
8.5.4 Health index
hfij =
1 + 2f + 2t
2(1 + 2t)
> hBij
8.5.5 Consumer surplus
CSf =
9 + 8t− 170t2 − 24f(1 + 2t− f)
48(1 + 2t)
= CSB − 24f(1 + 2t− f)
48(1 + 2t)
< CSB
8.5.6 Welfare
SW1f = −−9 + 24f
2 − 8t+ 26t2
48(1 + 2t)
< SW1B
SW2f =
15 + 24f − 24f2 + 32t− 26t2
48(1 + 2t)
and
SW2f − SW2B = (1− f)f
2(1 + 2t)
> 0if f < 1
8.6 Linear Excise Tax - Scenario 2: Taxing only product j
The analysis of this case leads to much more complex expressions.18 In order to characterize
the properties of the equilibrium as compared to the benchmark, we study the impact of
setting a marginal tax. Technically we study ∂X∂f |f=0 with X representing any variable at
the equilibrium.
In this case, we only provide the analytical expressions of prices at the second stage
and optimal qualities. To determine prices at the second stage and optimal qualities, we
use the profit functions defined by (6) for firm i and (21) for firm j.
18The Mathematica program is available to the authors upon request. It provides the analytical expres-
sions of all variables.
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8.6.1 Optimal qualities
xfji =
(f − 3t)(1 + f − t)
2(2f − 3t)(1 + 2t) (43)
xfjj =
(f − 3t)(1− 3f + 5t)
2(2f − 3t)(1 + 2t) (44)
From those expressions, it is straightforward to show that
∂xfji
∂f |f=0 > 0 and
∂xfjj
∂f |f=0 <
0. Moreover, we also have
∂xfjj
∂f = 0 for f =
1
2(3t−
√
t2 + 2t).
8.6.2 Equilibrium prices
Substituting xfji and x
fj
j into the second stage optimal prices, we get the equilibrium prices.
From which, we compute the partial derivatives. We get
∂pfji
∂f
|f=0 = −2(1 + 4t
2)(1 + t) + (1− t+ 2t2)
12t(1 + 2t)2
∂pfjj
∂f
|f=0 = 2(3t− 1) + 4t
2(5t− 1) + (1 + t+ 14t2)
12t(1 + 2t)2
It is easy to prove that under (13)
∂pfji
∂f |f=0 < 0 and
∂pfjj
∂f |f=0 > 0
8.6.3 Demands and Profits
From above, we deduce the demands and profits and calculate the partial derivative wrt f
∂Difji
∂f
|f=0 = 1 + 2t
18t2
> 0
∂Πfji
∂f
|f=0 = 2 + t
3(1 + 2t)2
> 0
∂Πfjj
∂f
|f=0 = −(2 + 7t)
3(1 + 2t)
It is easy to prove that under (13)
∂Difji
∂f |f=0 > 0 and thus that
∂Djfji
∂f |f=0 < 0 as the total
demand is fixed. We also have
∂Πfji
∂f |f=0 > 0 and
∂Πfjj
∂f |f=0 < 0
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8.6.4 Health index
From the demands and optimal qualities we compute the health index and calculate the
partial derivative wrt f
∂hfjij
∂f
|f=0 = 2(1− t) + 3t+ 7t
2 − 1
18t2(1 + 2t)
> 0
8.6.5 Consumer surplus
We get:
∂CSfj
∂f
|f=0 = −1
48t(1 + 2t)
< 0
Note that when f f increases, ∂CS
fj
∂f can be positive.
8.6.6 Welfare
We compute the impact of taxation on SW1 and SW2 and then calculate the partial
derivative wrt f
∂SW1fj
∂f
|f=0 = 24t
2 − 1
48t(1 + 2t)
> 0
∂SW2fj
∂f
|f=0 = 1 + 12t+ 24t
2
48t(1 + 2t)
> 0
8.6.7 Optimal taxation
We have proved that ∂SW1
f j
∂f |f=0 > 0 and ∂SW2
f j
∂f |f=0 > 0. Then there exists a positive tax
which improves welfare whether evaluated by a populist or a paternalistic social planner.
To determine the optimal tax, we need to check some conditions when optimizing the
welfare function over f . To remain in ‘case 1’ demand, two constraints need to hold:
x0 ≥ 0, and x1 ≤ 1. We also check for xi ≥ 0 and xj ≤ 1. Given the optimal choices
of qualities and prices by firms, we have: x0 ≥ 0 ⇔ f ≤ 4−4t+
√
16−50t+52t2
2 and x1 ≤
1⇔ f ≤ 8t−2−
√
4−14t+28t2
2 . The second condition is always the most restrictive. Denoting
fmax =
8t−2−√4−14t+28t2
2 , we find that both SW1 and SW2 increase with f ∈ [0, fmax].
Then, conditional on being in the ‘case 1’ demand, optimal welfare for f = fmax. We also
checked that when f = fmax, we have xi ≥ 0 and xj ≤ 1.
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When f > fmax, demand is defined by ‘case 3’. Given the level of taxation, the
equilibrium in this area implies xj = 1. We explore this domain numerically for the two
cases t = 3/4 and t = 9/10. We find that with high level of taxation f > fmax, the health
index decreases under its benchmark value. We thus do not analyse the welfare impact as
we are no longer in the case of a ’nutritional policy’ aiming at improving health.
8.7 Extension of the Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012) analysis
We use the model developed by Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2012) (hereafter DT) to analyse
in a context of two independent characteristics (taste and healthiness) how an MQS or
a linear tax on the low-quality product affects the choice of healthiness (quality) of the
high-quality good (entrant). We use the same notation as DT. We also remind that the
incumbent firm (denoted a) cannot modify its choice of location (ya = 0) and healthiness
(xa = 0). In the benchmark case, DT (pp. 846 and following) find x
∗
bm =
(1+γ)θ2−2α
2α2
when
θ2 >
2α
1+γ , with x
∗
bm the quality of product b, θ2 the willingness to pay for quality of type 2
consumers, α a cost parameter, and γ the ratio θ1/θ2 (with θ1 the the willingness to pay
for quality of type 1 consumers).
To analyse the impact of an MQS policy, we now analyse the strategic choice of quality
by firm b, assuming that the incumbent firm now produces a product of quality xa = mqs.
We also consider that θ2 is sufficiently large so that a positive xb is the optimal choice for
firm b. Prices at the second-stage equilibrium are given by:
pa =
1
6
[3 + 2yb(2 + yb) + αxb(2 + αxb)− xb(1 + γ)θ2 + 2αxa(2 + αxa) + xa(1 + γ)θ2]
pb =
1
6
[3 + 2yb(4− yb) + αxb(4 + 2αxb) + xb(1 + γ)θ2 + αxa(2 + αxa)− xa(1 + γ)θ2]
which extends the result by DT to the case in which xa > 0. Using these second
stage prices, we write the profit of firm b and then maximise its profit wrt xb and yb. In
particular, we find:
xb =
θ2(1 + γ)− 2α
2α2
which does not depend on xa and is identical to optimal choice of quality by firm b in
benchmark equilibrium.
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To analyse the impact of a tax policy, we now analyse the strategic choice of quality
by firm b, assuming that the incumbent firm now faces an excise tax t. We also consider
that θ2 is sufficiently large so that a positive xb is the optimal choice for firm b. Prices at
the second-stage equilibrium are given by:
pa =
1
6
[3 + 2yb(2 + yb) + αxb(2 + αxb)− xb(1 + γ)θ2 + 4t]
pb =
1
6
[3 + 2yb(4− yb) + αxb(4 + 2αxb) + xb(1 + γ)θ2 + 2t]
which extends the result by DT to the case in which firm a incurs a tax t. Using these
second stage prices, we write the profit of firm b and then maximise its profit wrt xb and
yb. In particular, we find:
xb =
θ2(1 + γ)− 2α
2α2
which does not depend on t.
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